Losing funds, or losing face? Reputation and Accountability in the Credit Rating Industry Assoc. Prof. Dr. Martin Angerer

Motivation:

- The Big Three (S&P, Moody's, Fitch) all rely on an issuer-pays remuneration model
- CRAs are accused of assigning inflated ratings (Becker & Milbourn, 2011; Jiang et al., 2012)
- Played a crucial role in the 2007 sub-prime mortgage crisis (Kashyap & Kovrijnykh, 2016)
- SEC states that a conflict-of-interest is "inherent" to the issuer-pays model (2008, p. 23)
- Issuer-paid CRAs argue that their credibility is at stake "reputational capital" offers value to investors (Partnoy, 2002; Smith & Walter, 2002)
- Even before the 2007 financial crisis, some already denoted an "accountability gap" (Kerwer, 2005) and a lack institutionalization

Research Question: "Can endogenous <u>reputation</u> and <u>accountability</u> mechanisms overcome adverse incentives for truth-telling in an issuer-pays model?"

Method: Experimental Market Setup with paid subjects.

Experimental Design

The Rating Cycle




Table 1: Comparison of Treatments

Treatment A (1+2)

Treatment B (1+2+3)

- dback
 - Extension of Treatment B

Treatment C (1+2+3+4)

- Competitive market without further features
- Competitive market with feedback system at the end of each period Investors submit a rating
- All subjects chat with each other and then investors submit rating

Findings:

- Solely reputation concerns can ONLY REDUCE rating inflation. This is driven by the CRA's concerns about future payoffs
- Accountability concerns in conjunctions with reputation concerns effectively EXTINGUISH rating inflation.
- Rise in fees before rating inflation published reports. High fees may be causal for continued rating inflation even where a reputation mechanism is in place.
- Research need to deeper analyze the role of accountability mechanisms in the rating industry

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