Referenz
Kirn, T. (2014, 15.05.-16.05.2014). Fiscal Equalization with Hidden Information and Hidden Action. Reforming Public Service Delivery, L'Université de Lausanne.
Publikationsart
Wissenschaftlicher Vortrag
Abstract
This paper studies the local tax policy setting behavior within a federal system under hidden information and hidden action by considering the incentive effects arising from elections and yardstick competition. It differsfrom earlier contributions by combining auction theory with a modern approach of fiscal federalism, based on agency theory. In this framework serves the yardstick competition as baseline model that leads to a Pareto efficient outcome, despite private information about the costs of service provision and rent-seeking activities of local policy makers. However, a first best solution is missed, if the local governments behave non-myopic. Despite this are both results from the perspective of principals (central level, local electorate) more advantageous than the outcome of a singular yardstick competition, which is in this comparison only third-best.
Forschung
- Mikrosimulation und Model Development
- Auftragsforschung, seit Juni 2009
Inhalt dieses Projekts ist die kontinuierliche Weiterentwicklung der liechtensteinischen Mikrosimulationsmodelle. Die Mikrosimulationsmodelle microLIE:PIT und microLIE:CIT bilden die Besteuerung ... mehr
Mitarbeiter
Einrichtungen
- Institut für Finanzdienstleistungen
- Lehrstuhl für Betriebswirtschaftliche Steuerlehre, Internationales und Liechtensteinisches Steuerrecht