Semester:WS 19/20
Art:Vorlesung
Plansemester:3
Lektionen / Semester:28.0 L / 21.0 h
Selbststudium:69.0 h
Art:Vorlesung
Plansemester:3
Lektionen / Semester:28.0 L / 21.0 h
Selbststudium:69.0 h
Modulleitung/Dozierende
- Prof. Dr. Marco J. Menichetti
(Modulleitung)
- Prof. Konstantinos Sergakis
(Externer Dozent)
- Dr. Franz-Josef Leven
(Externer Dozent)
Studiengang
Masterstudium Finance (01.09.2015)Beschreibung
- Role and Responsibility of Owners
- Practice of Right of Control for Various Actors
- The Problem of Free Riding
- Major Investors
- Conflicts of Interest Between Financiers
- Conflicts of Interest Between Stakeholders
- Financial Remuneration of Managers
- Alternative Designs for Option-Based Remuneration Structures for Managers
- Role and Responsibility of Institutions (Accounting, State)
- Corporate Governance in Financial Services Undertakings
- Optimal Design for Corporate Governance
- Empirical Investigations of Corporate Governance
- The role of Risk Management in Corporate Governance
Ziele
Students:
- illustrate the role and responsibility of corporate owners
- explain the right of corporate control
- describe the problem of free riding
- identify the special characteristic of major investors
- describe conflicts of interest
- scrutinise methods of remuneration of managers
- describe and critically evaluate differing designs for option-based remuneration structures regarding their effect
- demonstrate the role and responsibility of the board of directors, a company’s audit committee and the state
- explain the special characteristics of Corporate Governance in the undertakings of financial services
- develop optimal Corporate Governance structures
- contrast empirical investigations of Corporate Governance
- compare and contrast best practices in corporate governance with those of risk management
- evaluate the relationship between a firm’s risk appetite and its business strategy
- distinguish the different mechanisms for transmitting risk governance throughout an organization
- illustrate the interdependence of functional units within a firm as it relates to risk management
Kompetenzen
Literatur
Required reading:
- Brinsley, N. (2006). Executive Stock Options: Early Exercise Provisions and Risk-taking Incentives. The Journal of Finance, 61(5), 2487–2509.
- Crouhy, M., Galai, D., & Mark, R. (2014). The Essentials of Risk Management (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. [Chapter 4]
- Dittmann, I. & Maug, E. (2007). Lower Salaries and no Options: The optimal Structure of Executive Pay. The Journal of Finance, 62(1), 303-343.
- Hall, B. J., & Murphy, K.J. (2003). The Trouble With Stock Options. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(3), 49-70.
- Hall, B. J., & Murphy, K. J. (2002). Stock options for undiversified executives. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(1), 3-42.
- Monks, R.A.G., & Minow, N. (2011). Corporate Governance (5th ed.). Chichester: Wiley.
- Rezaee, Z. (2008). Corporate Governance and Ethics. London: Wiley.
Termine
Datum | Zeit | Raum |
13.09.2019 | 13:15 - 16:30 | H4 |
14.09.2019 | 09:00 - 12:15 | H3 |
14.09.2019 | 13:15 - 16:30 | H3 |
28.09.2019 | 09:00 - 12:15 | H6 (Fabrikweg) |
04.10.2019 | 09:00 - 12:15 | H3 |
05.10.2019 | 09:00 - 12:15 | H3 |
05.10.2019 | 13:15 - 16:30 | H3 |
Prüfungen
- PWW-MA_Corporate Governance (WS 19/20, bewertet)
- PWW-MA_Corporate Governance (Retake) (SS 20, bewertet)